1644 · Book · Treatise · English · Sutherland and Knox
Selections from the Principles of Philosophy
Description
Descartes' systematic exposition of his philosophy and physics, in four parts: the principles of human knowledge, of material things, the visible world, and the Earth. Amsterdam, 1644; the Latin text with John Veitch's 1850 English (Part I complete, selections from II-IV), aligned article by article.
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Contents
- From the Publisher's Preface
- Letter of the Author to the French Translator, serving for a Preface
- Dedication to the Princess Elizabeth
PART I. — Of the Principles of Human Knowledge
- ITHAT in order to seek truth, it is necessary once in the course of our life, to doubt, as far as possible, of all things.
- IIThat we ought also to consider as false all that is doubtful.
- IIIThat we ought not meanwhile to make use of doubt in the conduct of life.
- IVWhy we may doubt of sensible things.
- VWhy we may also doubt of mathematical demonstrations.
- VIThat we possess a free-will, by which we can withhold our assent from what is doubtful, and thus avoid error.
- VIIThat we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt, and that this is the first knowledge we acquire when we philosophize in order.
- VIIIThat we hence discover the distinction between the mind and the body, or between a thinking and corporeal thing.
- IXWhat thought (COGITATIO) is.
- XThat the notions which are simplest and self-evident, are obscured by logical definitions; and that such are not to be reckoned among the cognitions acquired by study, \[but as born with us].
- XIHow we can know our mind more clearly than our body.
- XIIHow it happens that every one does not come equally to know this.
- XIIIIn what sense the knowledge of other things depends upon the knowledge of God.
- XIVThat we may validly infer the existence of God from necessary existence being comprised in the concept we have of him.
- XVThat necessary existence is not in the same way comprised in the notions which we have of other things, but merely contingent existence.
- XVIThat prejudices hinder many from clearly knowing the necessity of the existence of God.
- XVIIThat the greater objective (representative) perfection there is in our idea of a thing, the greater also must be the perfection of its cause.
- XVIIIThat the existence of God may be again inferred from the above.
- XIXThat, although we may not comprehend the nature of God, there is yet nothing which we know so clearly as his perfections.
- XXThat we are not the cause of ourselves, but that this is God, and consequently that there is a God.
- XXIThat the duration alone of our life is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of God.
- XXIIThat in knowing the existence of God, in the manner here explained, we likewise know all his attributes, as far as they can be known by the natural light alone.
- XXIIIThat God is not corporeal, and does not perceive by means of senses as we do, or will the evil of sin.
- XXIVThat in passing from the knowledge of God to the knowledge of the creatures, it is necessary to remember that our understanding is finite, and the power of God infinite.
- XXVThat we must believe all that God has revealed, although it may surpass the reach of our faculties.
- XXVIThat it is not needful to enter into disputes \[Footnote: "to essay to comprehend the infinite."—FRENCH.] regarding the infinite, but merely to hold all that in which we can find no limits as indefinite, such as the extension of the world, the divisibility of the parts of matter, the number of the stars, etc.
- XXVIIWhat difference there is between the indefinite and the infinite.
- XXVIIIThat we must examine, not the final, but the efficient, causes of created things.
- XXIXThat God is not the cause of our errors.
- XXXThat consequently all which we clearly perceive is true, and that we are thus delivered from the doubts above proposed.
- XXXIThat our errors are, in respect of God, merely negations, but, in respect of ourselves, privations.
- XXXIIThat there are only two modes of thinking in us, viz., the perception of the understanding and the action of the will.
- XXXIIIThat we never err unless when we judge of something which we do not sufficiently apprehend.
- XXXIVThat the will as well as the understanding is required for judging.
- XXXVThat the will is of greater extension than the understanding, and is thus the source of our errors.
- XXXVIThat our errors cannot be imputed to God.
- XXXVIIThat the chief perfection of man is his being able to act freely or by will, and that it is this which renders him worthy of praise or blame.
- XXXVIIIThat error is a defect in our mode of acting, not in our nature; and that the faults of their subjects may be frequently attributed to other masters, but never to God.
- XXXIXThat the liberty of our will is self-evident.
- XLThat it is likewise certain that God has fore-ordained all things.
- XLIHow the freedom of our will may be reconciled with the Divine pre-ordination.
- XLIIHow, although we never will to err, it is nevertheless by our will that we do err.
- XLIIIThat we shall never err if we give our assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive.
- XLIVThat we uniformly judge improperly when we assent to what we do not clearly perceive, although our judgment may chance to be true; and that it is frequently our memory which deceives us by leading us to believe that certain things were formerly sufficiently understood by us.
- XLVWhat constitutes clear and distinct perception.
- XLVIIt is shown, from the example of pain, that a perception may be clear without being distinct, but that it cannot be distinct unless it is clear.
- XLVIIThat, to correct the prejudices of our early years, we must consider what is clear in each of our simple \[Footnote: "first."— FRENCH.] notions.
- XLVIIIThat all the objects of our knowledge are to be regarded either (1) as things or the affections of things: or (2) as eternal truths; with the enumeration of things.
- XLIXThat the eternal truths cannot be thus enumerated, but that this is not necessary.
- LThat these truths are clearly perceived, but not equally by all men, on account of prejudices.
- LIWhat substance is, and that the term is not applicable to God and the creatures in the same sense.
- LIIThat the term is applicable univocally to the mind and the body, and how substance itself is known.
- LIIIThat of every substance there is one principal attribute, as thinking of the mind, extension of the body.
- LIVHow we may have clear and distinct notions of the substance which thinks, of that which is corporeal, and of God.
- LVHow duration, order, and number may be also distinctly conceived.
- LVIWhat are modes, qualities, attributes.
- LVIIThat some attributes exist in the things to which they are attributed, and others only in our thought; and what duration and time are.
- LVIIIThat number and all universals are only modes of thought.
- LIXHow universals are formed; and what are the five common, viz., genus, species, difference, property, and accident.
- LXOf distinctions; and first of the real.
- LXIOf the modal distinction.
- LXIIOf the distinction of reason (logical distinction).
- LXIIIHow thought and extension may be distinctly known, as constituting, the one the nature of mind, the other that of body.
- LXIVHow these may likewise be distinctly conceived as modes of substance.
- LXVHow we may likewise know their modes.
- LXVIHow our sensations, affections, and appetites may be clearly known, although we are frequently wrong in our judgments regarding them.
- LXVIIThat we are frequently deceived in our judgments regarding pain itself.
- LXVIIIHow in these things what we clearly conceive is to be distinguished from that in which we may be deceived.
- LXIXThat magnitude, figure, etc., are known far differently from colour, pain, etc.
- LXXThat we may judge of sensible things in two ways, by the one of which we avoid error, by the other fall into it.
- LXXIThat the chief cause of our errors is to be found in the prejudices of our childhood.
- LXXIIThat the second cause of our errors is that we cannot forget these prejudices.
- LXXIIIThe third cause is, that we become fatigued by attending to those objects which are not present to the senses; and that we are thus accustomed to judge of these not from present perception but from pre-conceived opinion.
- LXXIVThe fourth source of our errors is, that we attach our thoughts to words which do not express them with accuracy.
- LXXVSummary of what must be observed in order to philosophize correctly.
- LXXVIThat we ought to prefer the Divine authority to our perception; \[Footnote: "reasonings."—FRENCH]. but that, apart from things revealed, we ought to assent to nothing that we do not clearly apprehend.
PART II. — Of the Principles of Material Things
- IThe grounds on which the existence of material things may be known with certainty.
- IIHow we likewise know that the human body is closely connected with the mind.
- IIIThat the perceptions of the senses do not teach us what is in reality in things, but what is beneficial of hurtful to the composite whole of mind and body.
- IVThat the nature of body consists not in weight hardness, colour and the like, but in extension alone.
- VThat the truth regarding the nature of body is obscured by the opinions respecting rarefaction and a vacuum with which we are pre- occupied.
- VIIn what way rarefaction takes place.
- VIIThat rarefaction cannot be intelligibly explained unless in the way here proposed.
- VIIIThat quantity and number differ only in thought (RATIONE) from that which has quantity and is numbered.
- IXThat corporeal substance, when distinguished from its quantity, is confusedly conceived as something incorporeal.
- XWhat space or internal place is.
- XIHow space is not in reality different from corporeal substance.
- XIIHow space differs from body in our mode of conceiving it.
- XIIIWhat external place is.
- XIVWherein place and space differ.
- XVHow external place is rightly taken for the superficies of the surrounding body.
- XVIThat a vacuum or space in which there is absolutely no body is repugnant to reason.
- XVIIThat a vacuum in the ordinary use of the term does not exclude all body.
- XVIIIHow the prejudice of an absolute vacuum is to be corrected.
- XIXThat this confirms what was said of rarefaction.
- XXThat from this the non-existence of atoms may likewise be demonstrated.
- XXIIt is thus also demonstrated that the extension of the world is indefinite.
- XXIIIt also follows that the matter of the heavens and earth is the same, and that there cannot be a plurality of worlds.
- XXIIIThat all the variety of matter, or the diversity of its forms, depends on motion.
- XXIVWhat motion is, taking the term in its common use.
- XXVWhat motion is properly so called.
PART III. — Of the Visible World
PART IV. — Of the Earth
- CLXXXVIIIOf what is to be borrowed from disquisitions on animals and man to advance the knowledge of material objects.
- CLXXXIXWhat perception (SENSUS) is, and how we perceive.
- CXCOf the distinction of the senses; and, first, of the internal, that is, of the affections of the mind (passions), and the natural appetites.
- CXCIOf the external senses; and first of touch.
- CXCIIOf taste.
- CXCIIIOf smell.
- CXCIVOf hearing.
- CXCVOf sight.
- CXCVIThat the soul perceives only in so far as it is in the brain.
- CXCVIIThat the nature of the mind is such that from the motion alone of body the various sensations can be excited in it.
- CXCVIIIThat by our senses we know nothing of external objects beyond their figure \[or situation], magnitude, and motion.
- CXCIXThat there is no phenomenon of nature whose explanation has been omitted in this treatise.
- CCThat this treatise contains no principles which are not universally received; and that this philosophy is not new, but of all others the most ancient and common.
- CCIThat sensible bodies are composed of insensible particles.
- CCIIThat the philosophy of Democritus is not less different from ours than from the common. \[Footnote: "that of Aristotle or the others."—French.]
- CCIIIHow we may arrive at the knowledge of the figures, \[magnitudes], and motions of the insensible particles of bodies.
- CCIVThat, touching the things which our senses do not perceive, it is sufficient to explain how they can be, \[and that this is all that Aristotle has essayed].
- CCVThat nevertheless there is a moral certainty that all the things of this world are such as has been here shown they may be.
- CCVIThat we possess even more than a moral certainty of it.
- CCVIIThat, however, I submit all my opinions to the authority of the church.
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