PART III.Of the Visible World
IThat we cannot think too highly of the works of God.III.1
Having now ascertained certain principles of material things, which were sought, not by the prejudices of the senses, but by the light of reason, and which thus possess so great evidence that we cannot doubt of their truth, it remains for us to consider whether from these alone we can deduce the explication of all the phenomena of nature. We will commence with those phenomena that are of the greatest generality, and upon which the others depend, as, for example, with the general structure of this whole visible world. But in order to our philosophizing aright regarding this, two things are first of all to be observed. The first is, that we should ever bear in mind the infinity of the power and goodness of God, that we may not fear falling into error by imagining his works to be too great, beautiful, and perfect, but that we may, on the contrary, take care lest, by supposing limits to them of which we have no certain knowledge, we appear to think less highly than we ought of the power of God.
I Opera Dei nimis ampla cogitari non posse.
Inuentis iam quibusdam principiis rerum materialium, quae non a praeiudiciis sensuum, sed a lumine rationis ita petita sunt, ut de ipsorum ueritate dubitare nequeamus, examinandum est, an ex iis solis omnia naturae phaenomena possimus explicare. Incipiendumque ab iis quae maxime uniuersalia sunt, et a quibus reliqua dependent: nempe a generali totius huius mundi adspectabilis constructione. De qua ut recte philosophemur, duo sunt inprimis obseruanda. Unum, ut attendentes ad infinitam Dei potentiam et bonitatem, ne uereamur nimis ampla, et pulchra, et absoluta eius opera imaginari; sed e contra caueamus, ne si quos forte limites, nobis non certo cognitos, in ipsis supponamus, non satis magnifice de Creatoris potentia sentire uideamur.
IIThat we ought to beware lest, in our presumption, we imagine that the ends which God proposed to himself in the creation of the world are understood by us.III.2
The second is, that we should beware of presuming too highly of ourselves, as it seems we should do if we supposed certain limits to the world, without being assured of their existence either by natural reasons or by divine revelation, as if the power of our thought extended beyond what God has in reality made; but likewise still more if we persuaded ourselves that all things were created by God for us only, or if we merely supposed that we could comprehend by the power of our intellect the ends which God proposed to himself in creating the universe.
II Cauendum esse, ne nimis superbe de nobis ipsis sentientes, fines quos Deus sibi proposuit in creando mundo, a nobis intelligi supponamus.
Alterum, ut etiam caueamus, ne nimis superbe de nobis ipsis sentiamus. Quod fieret non modo, si quos limites, nobis nulla cognitos ratione nec diuina reuelatione, mundo uellemus affingere, tanquam si uis nostrae cogitationis, ultra id quod a Deo reuera factum est, ferri posset; sed etiam maxime, si res omnes propter nos solos ab illo creatas esse fingeremus; uel tantum, si fines quos sibi proposuit in creando uniuerso, ingenii nostri ui comprehendi posse putaremus.
IIIIn what sense it may be said that all things were created for the sake of man.III.3
For although, as far as regards morals, it may be a pious thought to believe that God made all things for us, seeing we may thus be incited to greater gratitude and love toward him; and although it is even in some sense true, because there is no created thing of which we cannot make some use, if it be only that of exercising our mind in considering it, and honouring God on account of it, it is yet by no means probable that all things were created for us in this way that God had no other end in their creation; and this supposition would be plainly ridiculous and inept in physical reasoning, for we do not doubt but that many things exist, or formerly existed and have now ceased to be, which were never seen or known by man, and were never of use to him.
III Quo sensu dici possit omnia propter hominem facta esse.
Quamuis enim in Ethicis sit pium dicere, omnia a Deo propter nos facta esse, ut nempe tanto magis ad agendas ei gratias impellamur, eiusque amore incendamur; ac quamuis etiam suo sensu sit uerum, quatenus scilicet rebus omnibus uti possumus aliquo modo, saltem ad ingenium nostrum in iis consideran- dis exercendum, Deumque ob admiranda eius opera suspiciendum: nequaquam tamen est uerisimile, sic omnia propter nos facta esse, ut nullus alius sit eorum usus; essetque plane ridiculum et ineptum id in Physica consideratione supponere; quia non dubitamus, quin multa existant, uel olim extiterint, iamque esse desierint, quae nunquam ab ullo homine uisa sunt aut intellecta, nunquamque ullum usum ulli praebuerunt.